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The impact of uncertainty on firms’ investment outlays is subject to an ongoing debate.
Theory identifies several channels. Irreversibility, financing constraints and risk aversion
make a  relationship between uncertainty and investment likely. On the other hand,
the ability of firms to adapt after uncertainty is resolved can make a risky strategy more
attractive. Therefore, risk may also constitute an incentive to invest. The net effect is
theoretically indeterminate. The empirical literature has not yet been able to settle the
question.
This paper studies the impact of uncertainty on firm’s investment outlays using the database
of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet statistics. Our database represents
roughly 75% of the total turnover of the west German manufacturing sector. The sample
used for estimation contains 6,745 firms with almost 50,000 observations, covering the
years 1987 - 1997. This is a period long enough to generate measures of uncertainty
specific to both firm and time.
Using panel econometric methods, we estimate the effect of 	
 and 
 on investment demand. We obtain two key results. First, there is a moderately
strong and consistently  effect of uncertainty on investment. If both uncertainty
indicators are increased by one standard deviation, the estimated investment demand will
fall by 6½% of its mean. Furthermore, it emerges that sales uncertainty and cost uncertainty
are of equal importance for investment: both our indicators contribute about 3 percentage
points to the total reduction of investment.
	
	Investment, Uncertainty, Panel Estimation
	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Der Einfluss von Unsicherheit auf das Investitionsverhalten von Unternehmen ist
Gegenstand einer fortdauernden Diskussion. Theoretische Überlegungen zeigen eine Reihe
möglicher Kanäle auf. Einerseits lassen Irreversibilitäten, Finanzierungsrestriktionen und
Risikoaversion eine  Wirkung erwarten. Auf der anderen Seite kann die
Fähigkeit von Unternehmen, sich nach Auflösung der Unsicherheit den neuen
Gegebenheiten in optimaler Weise anzupassen, risikoreichere Alternativen vorteilhaft
erscheinen lassen. Daher kann Risiko einen 
 darstellen.
Die Gesamtwirkung ist theoretisch unbestimmt. Auch die empirische Literatur ist bislang
nicht zu einhelligen Ergebnissen gekommen.
In dieser Arbeit wird der Einfluss von Unsicherheit auf das Investitionsverhalten mit Hilfe
der Unternehmensbilanzdaten der Deutschen Bundesbank untersucht. Unser Datenbestand
repräsentiert etwa 75% des gesamten Umsatzes im westdeutschen Verarbeitenden
Gewerbe. Die hieraus erzeugte Stichprobe enthält 6  745 Firmen mit fast 50  000
Beobachtungen aus den Jahren 1987  -  1997. Der Zeitraum ist groß genug, um
Unsicherheitsmaße zu gewinnen, die nicht nur unternehmensspezifisch sind, sondern auch
in der Zeit variieren.
Mit Hilfe panelökonometrischer Verfahren wird die Wirkung von 	 und
 auf die Investitionsnachfrage untersucht. Hierbei ergeben sich zwei
wichtige Resultate. Zum einen übt Unsicherheit einen eindeutig  Effekt mittlerer
Stärke aus. Erhöht man beide Unsicherheitsindikatoren jeweils um eine
Standardabweichung, so verringert sich die geschätzte Investitionsnachfrage hierdurch um
6½% des Mittelwerts. Weiterhin zeigt sich, daß Absatz- und Kostenunsicherheit für die
Investitionsnachfrage von gleicher Bedeutung sind: Beide Indikatoren tragen rund 3
Prozentpunkte zu dem geschätzten Investitionsrückgang bei.
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There are several channels through which uncertainty may affect firms' investment outlays.
The oldest and most intuitive account focuses on firms' attitude towards risk, see, e.g.,
Hartman (1976) or the textbook exposition by Nickell (1978). Risk averse owners and their
managers will systematically trade expected returns for certainty with regard to the state of
nature. The standard capital asset pricing model shows how this aversion is translated into
the equilibrium framework. Risk – or better: undiversified risk – commands a premium
that results in higher costs of capital.
Another potential avenue comes from financial constraints due to asymmetric information.
Providers of outside finance demand higher returns (or limit their exposure) if they are not
able to evaluate the investment opportunity with the same precision as the investor himself.
The asymmetry might be graver – and the resulting constraints severer – if the prospects of
the firm look more uncertain 

. This view is advocated and empirically
tested by Minton and Schrand (1999). Ghosal and Loungani (2000) argue that the impact of
uncertainty on investment might differ across firms, depending on their access to the
capital markets.
But even financially unconstrained investors who maximize the expected value of their
companies given an exogenous discount rate will not be indifferent towards risk. In recent
years, the burgeoning literature on irreversibility and investment initiated by McDonald
and Siegel (1986) and first summarized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) emphasizes the fact
that the sunk costs of an investment project create an option value if the investment
decision can be delayed. Generally, the right to perform a given investment project at a
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later date, when more information is available, bears a positive value for the firm, at least
under imperfect competition. This value can be calculated just like the price of a call option
on an interest bearing asset. Immediate investment will destroy this "option value", such
that it has to be taken into account as an additional opportunity cost of capital. Abel and
Eberly (1996) emphasize that the option value effect is mitigated under competitive
conditions: if the marginal value of additional capital in the future does not depend on the
investment decision taken in the present, the option value disappears.
Formally, the irreversibility literature describes investment behavior as the solution to
stochastic control problems. In order to trigger immediate commitment, the expected
returns of an irreversible investment project must surpass a threshold value that is not only
higher than the standard costs of capital but also – as any option value – an increasing
function of risk. The irreversible investment theory has various implications which are
highly relevant for policymakers. The model explains why the user costs of capital do not
appear to have much influence on investment demand in many empirical investigations;
neither in the aggregate nor on the firm level.) Changes in the user costs are relevant only
for those firms which happen to be near their individual investment threshold, but not for
the mass of firms operating below that threshold. Furthermore, the model predicts an
attitude of "wait and see" even in the face of high expected returns when the economic
environment is ambivalent and uncertain. The commitment of capital is more expensive if
the future is unpredictable.
A different conclusion is reached by the literature stressing the convexity of the marginal
product of capital, as in Abel (1983) and Hartman (1972, 1976). If variable factors, such as
labor, energy or raw materials can be optimally adjusted  demand uncertainty is
resolved, marginal returns of capital are not linear in product prices any more – the
functional relationship will be convex, and Jensen's inequality makes  profits an
increasing function of risk, given optimal adjustment.
The deeper truth behind this result is that risk also contains an element of opportunity. By
suitably adapting to the various possible situations  a commitment has taken place and
uncertainty is resolved, the investor can systematically put a higher weight on favorable
outcomes. In a way, this proposition is the mirror image of the irreversible investment
argument. Whereas the latter stresses the importance of irreversibility for the 
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price elasticity of capital demand for the Bundesbank data set.– 3 –
 of capital goods, the former conversely insists on the beneficial effect that free and
unconstrained use of the complementary factors have on the expected  in the face of
uncertainty. This again indicates a lesson for economic policy: on the importance of
individual flexibility for investment, be it with regard to the allocation of capital goods or
the use of complementary factors.
Still, the Hartman-Abel argument renders the sign of the relationship between uncertainty
and investment indeterminate. Depending on the type of project, the technology of the firm,
its market power, and the stochastic nature of the relevant shock variable, different effects
of increased uncertainty are conceivable. In general, uncertainty can act as a deterrent from
investment, be neutral or even create new incentives, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chs. 6
and 11), Böhm, Funke and Siegfried (2000) or Darby, Hallet, Ireland and Piscitelli (1999).
Empirically, it is not easy to test an isolated hypothesis on the effect of uncertainty on
investment expenditure. In general, for a given firm or sector, several mechanisms will be
at work simultaneously. Even in the conceptually clean world of economic models,
abstracting from risk aversion and endogenous costs of capital, it is hard to disentangle the
separate aspects of the problem. The situation is much worse empirically, when many of
the underlying determinants cannot be observed.
A more modest strategy therefore consists in trying to pin down the net effects of
uncertainty on investment behavior, and at the same time gathering information on what
kind of uncertainty is most important for investment decisions. As far as monetary policy is
concerned, this will give us an assessment of the significance of a stable institutional
environment for the real economy and it may serve as a starting point for a more specific
inquiry in the future.
-*	$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Attempts to investigate the effects of uncertainty on investment empirically are relatively
recent. There are some disadvantages in using the more easily accessible aggregate data. First,
most shocks relevant for investment decisions are firm specific, and are smoothed out in the
aggregate. Macroeconomic or sectoral data thus might mismeasure uncertainty. Second,
aggregation also conceals the  of firms to uncertainty. Caballero and Engel (1994)
and Bertola and Caballero (1994) discuss the dynamics of aggregate investment if individual
behavior is guided by threshold behavior, as is described by the more recent literature on
investment and uncertainty. Even if firms undertake sporadic bursts of investments in order to– 4 –
keep their capital stock between an upper and a lower threshold, aggregate investment
behavior will be smooth and autocorrelated with low adjustment rates.-
The author is aware of only five publications that investigate the significance of uncertainty
using firm level data: Leahy and Whited (1996), Minton and Schrand (1999), and Driver,
Yip and Dakhil (1996) using data on US firms, Guiso and Parigi (1999) working on a panel
of Italian companies, and Patillo (1998) utilizing a panel of Ghanaian firms. In addition,
however, there is a growing number of unpublished research papers. Among these are
Bloom, Bond and van Reenen (1999) using data on companies quoted on the UK stock
market; Peeters (1999) investigating a panel of Belgian and Spanish firms; Bo (1999)
investigating Dutch firms; and Lensink and Sterken (1998) working on Czech firms. The
forthcoming publication of Böhm, Funke and Siegfried (2000) identifies a 
uncertainty-investment link in a sample of 70 large German corporations, which turns
negative for firms in very concentrated industries. Some of the other papers also produce
ambiguous results. See Carruth, Dickerson and Henley (2000) for a recent survey of the
empirical literature.
The Bundesbank's corporate balance sheet database constitutes the largest collection of
accounting data for non financial firms in Germany. A detailed description is contained in
Deutsche Bundesbank (1998), see also Friderichs and Sauvé (1999), and Stöss (2000). The
collection of financial statements originates from the Bundesbank's function of performing
credit assessments within the scope of its rediscount operations. Every year more than
70,000 annual accounts are collected, on a strictly confidential basis, by the Bundesbank's
branch offices. They are recorded on a computer which automatically checks for logical
errors and missing data. Of these, approximately 15,000 have to be excluded. These are
either consolidated accounts or financial statements for incomplete financial years or
balance sheets of firms in sectors in which – owing to the small number of accounts
available  – no meaningful results can be produced. Following additional checks and
corrections for errors in the Statistical Department of the Bundesbank's Central Office in
Frankfurt, they constitute the corporate balance sheet database. According to the turnover
tax statistics, it represents roughly 75% of the total turnover of the West German
manufacturing sector, albeit only 8% of the total number of firms.
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Unfortunately, not all of these data can be employed in estimation. In order to maintain
comparability, we limit ourselves to incorporated private firms. We exclude sole
proprietorships and unincorporated partnerships because of differences in accounting rules,
as well as all publicly owned enterprises, as the latter might not be profit oriented. Again
for reasons of comparability, we only consider West German manufacturing firms, and we
confine ourselves to the years 1987 - 1997. Earlier years are affected by the radical
regulatory changes in accounting introduced in 1985, triggered by an EU directive on the
harmonization of financial statements. Furthermore, only part of our firm data permit the
calculation of a real capital stock using the perpetual inventory method, principally because
of missing investment data. In order to generate our uncertainty indicator as described in
the next paragraph, we lose four consecutive observations, and still more are needed for
Within estimates. After eliminating outliers, our sample still contains 6,745 firms with
almost 50,000 observations. This sample is clearly not representative in a strict statistical
sense, but it mirrors the west German industrial structure relatively well. Very often,
balance sheet data only contain large and listed firms, whereas in our sample the median
number of employees is 118, with a large portion of small and medium sized enterprises
that make up the core of West German industry. The Appendix gives an overview




Uncertainty is a quality of investors' mental representation of the world, and it cannot be
quantified with the same precision as prices or output. Basically, there are three different
ways to construct uncertainty indicators on the firm level. The most direct method is to ask
managers about the subjective certainty of their expectations. Primary data are expensive
and difficult to obtain. As with all surveys, one has to make sure that the questionnaire is
answered by the right person, that it is answered correctly and that it is answered at all.
Guiso and Parigi (1999) exploit data on the subjective probability distribution of investors
contained in a survey conducted by the Banca d'Italia, and Patillo (1999) uses a similar data
set for 200 entrepreneurs in Ghana constructed with administrative help from the World
Bank and the UK government. A cheaper alternative is to make use of regular industry
survey data. In the course of their transnational study, Caselli, Pagano and Schivardi (2000)
compute for each year the standard deviation of the balance of positive and negative
answers to the survey questions conducted by the respective national research agency. The– 6 –
same method might be applied to generate sector specific data for the industries of a given
country. For inferential purposes, however, we are more interested in firm specific data.
A second approach is to rely on high frequency financial market data and to use volatilities,
either of commodity prices or exchange rates, or else of stock prices. The first line of
research, exemplified in the paper of Darby, Hughes, Ireland and Piscitelli (1999), directly
quantifies the degree of uncertainty with respect to some crucial economic variables;
however, it cannot differentiate between firms. The use of stock market data, as in Bloom,
Bond and van Reenen (1999), or Böhm, Funke and Siegfried (2000), assumes a strong
form of market efficiency and implicitly equates firms' information on future profits to the
information of market participants in general. The volatility of stock prices indicates the
frequency with which market participants revise their expectations and therefore might
allow inferences on their current degree of subjective certainty. This line of argument can
be compared to the standard assumption that all relevant expectations of future profitability
are summarized by a firm's stock market valuation and then using Tobin's Q as a catch all
for everything that influences investment. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the
relationship between the accuracy of managers' expectations with respect to unrealized
investment opportunities, and the ups and downs of a firm's stock market valuation.
Another disadvantage of this approach is the 

limitation to large and listed firms.
Finally, one can try to generate uncertainty indicators from annual or quarterly financial
statements of individual firms, measuring the volatility of operating profits, cash flow and
other variables. This is the route which will be taken here. Peeters (1999), Bo (1999),
Ghosal and Loungani (2000) and Minton and Schrand (1999) proceed in the same fashion.
Balance sheet or income statement data naturally yield firm specific indicators and thus can
exploit the individual variability of a large panel data set, but one still has to find a
convincing way to make them time specific as well.
/*-*	 0	%	&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Profit is the difference between sales and costs. For both of these we will construct
uncertainty indicators. Let us consider first uncertainty with respect to real sales,  W  . We
hypothesize that the logarithm of sales follows an autoregressive process of first order.
Furthermore, it may be assumed that the firm is provided with more or less accurate
information with regard to the state of the business cycle in the respective sector. This




W W L L W L       , 1 , , log log + + + = − (1)– 7 –
The constant  L   is firm specific and depends on the size of the firm. The AR coefficient 
quantifies the persistence of deviations from equilibrium, and its magnitude is thought of
as being characteristic for an entire market or sector. The third term,  W  , is a cyclical
component. It is time specific, but identical for all firms of a given sector and it will also
account for the sectoral growth trend. The last term, 
6








This equation is estimated for 78 clusters of firms, constructed by first using two digit
sectoral classifications and then the average number of employees as a grouping criterion.
The number of firms per year in these unbalanced samples varies between 100 and 300,
with a few outliers in both directions. A fixed effects estimator for equation (1) is used and
the residuals – being estimates of 
6
W L  ,  – are stored. As an uncertainty indicator, finally, the














W L   (2)
This uncertainty indicator is generated for firms that are represented in our data set with at
least 8 consecutive observations. This restriction is nessessary because of the loss in
degrees of freedom resulting from the inclusion of a firm specific constant in (1). Residuals
for the current period are not used, for two reasons. One is structural. When making the
investment decision in the course of the current period, the investor does not yet know the– 8 –








The indicator in (2) is firm specific, time-varying and forward looking in the following
sense: it is assumed that the firm anticipates the dynamic development of its own sector or
cluster perfectly. We filter out aggregate volatility, because it might partly reflect the
economic downturns in Germany during the years 1992-1997. By doing so, we do not
intend to downplay 
, i.e. uncertainty with respect to monetary or
fiscal policy or other macroeconomic variables. Quite the contrary: as aggregate
uncertainty affects all firms in a given part of the economy simultaneously, multiplier
effects are conceivable if firms interact closely. All the key results of the paper, with the
exception of the instrumental variables estimations, can be reproduced using an uncertainty
indicator generated by performing OLS regressions without time dummies for each firm
separately.
Graphs 1 and 2 show the overall distributions of the idiosyncratic sales shock and the
resulting uncertainty indicator. As the uncertainty indicator derives from the squares of
symmetrically, almost normally distributed shocks, its distribution is skewed to the right,
akin to a Chi
2-distribution. The inclusion of  W   in equation (1) has eliminated the business
cycle dependence of the indicator, but there remains a broad variability – between firms as
well as within firms. This can be seen from the summary statistics in Appendix B.– 9 –
The counterpart of our indicator for sales uncertainty is 
. We generate our








and use output prices as deflators. Of course, operating costs are highly correlated with real
sales. Therefore, we generate 	
	/ by regressing real operating costs on
real sales. This is done by estimating the equation
&
W L W L L L W L     # , , , log log + + = (4)
separately for each firm that provides at least 8 consecutive observations, using OLS. Here,
W L # ,  denote real operating costs and 
&
W L  ,  is a firm and time specific cost shock. The
objective, of course, is not to estimate firm specific cost functions, but simply to filter out
all direct and indirect linear effects of  W L  ,  on  W L # ,  in order to obtain pure cost shocks. The
cost residuals are aggregated in the same way as before, leading to an uncertainty indicator
labeled 
&
W L  , .
5*	 		6
In order to investigate the significance of uncertainty for West German industrial
companies, we will not impose too many restrictions. As a benchmark, we derive an
accelerator equation from the standard neoclassical model. Then we test whether the
inclusion of an uncertainty term has additional explanatory power and try to quantify the
net effect.
The model platform corresponds to that used recently by Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer
(1999), Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999), and Harhoff and Ramb (2000). The investor is
supposed to maximize the present value of the firm:
()
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/ This approach emerged from a discussion with Bob Chirinko.– 10 –
() W W W    + δ − = − 1 1    . s.t    , (6)
with  W   representing the discount rate,  W   the product price, 
,
W   the price of capital goods,
W   the stock of real capital,  W $  the labor input,  W %  the wage rate, δ  the rate of depreciation
and  W   real investment. Abstracting from irreversibility, uncertainty, delivery lags, costs of
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where  W '  is productivity and σ  and ν  are the elasticities of substitution and scale,






































together with a similar equation for  () W W / $   , . The right hand side of (9) defines the user
cost of capital,  W ( . Substitution yields:



























The variable  W   depends on the time varying terms  W '  and  W ( . The elasticity of capital to
sales is unity ( 1 = θ ), if the production function has constant returns to scale ( 1 = ν ), or if
its elasticity of substitution is unity ( 1 = σ ), that is, in the Cobb-Douglas case. A log linear– 11 –
demand equation can also be derived for the case of increasing returns to scale,  1 > ν . If
the firm is rationed on the product market, it will have to solve a cost minimization
problem. Then we have  ν = θ 1  in (10) and  W   will be a term that depends on relative
factor prices and the CES parameters. In terms of first differences we obtain from (10):
W W W    log log log ∆ + ∆ θ = ∆  . (12)
The first term,  W  log ∆  is approximately equal to  δ − − 1 W W   . The depreciation rate will
be subsumed into the unobservable firm specific latent variable in the estimation
procedures below. The change in  W  log  can be represented by time dummies in our
regression equation, at least as far as global productivity shocks and changes in the user
costs are concerned, and by individual constants in order to catch trends in the course of the
firm's technological progress. Individual productivity shocks are confined to the error term
of the equation and might create an endogeneity problem.
We assume that the production possibilities are given by the capital stock at the beginning
of the current period. We specify a distributed lag in order to account for short term
adaptation dynamics and add contemporaneous and lagged real cash flow per unit of
capital growth rates of cash flow as further regressors to capture financial constraints and
possible effects of expectation formation. Finally, we introduce the uncertainty indicator,
calculated as described in Sect. 3. In the simple world of the accelerator model, they should
turn out insignificant. As a behavioral equation to be estimated, we obtain for company :

































− ∑ ∑ , (13)
with W L W L W L  , , ζ + λ + α = , (14)
where differences of logarithms are denoted by a hat.  W L  ,  is one of the two uncertainty
indicators described above,  W L ) ,  represents cash flow,  1 , − W L   is the real capital stock carried
over from the end of last period and  W L  ,  is a latent term. It is composed of a firm specific
constant  L α , a time specific shock  W λ  equal for all firms, and finally an idiosyncratic
transitory shock  W L, ζ . In this quite general specification, the data are allowed to determine
the adaptation dynamics. Appendix B gives the summary statistics for the variables used.– 12 –
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Preliminary analysis recommends a lag length of no more than three years. All results in
this paper, however, are robust against variation of the lag length. The Random Effects
model is clearly rejected by the Hausman test: correlation between the firm specific latent
variable and the regressors leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we limit
our inference procedure use of variation % firms. In Table 1 we present results which
eliminate the distorting impact of the latent firm specific variable, but do not yet address
the potential endogeneity problem. Columns (1) and (2) contain the Mean Difference
(LSDV) and First Difference estimations of the accelerator model % uncertainty
indicator. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, allowing for autocorrelation
within firms as well as heteroscedasticity in general. Both cash flow and real sales growth
are highly relevant for the individual investment decision. The sum of the real sales
coefficients may be interpreted as the elasticity of capital demand with respect to output.
The value of about 25% is well below the constant returns benchmark of 100%. This result
is quite common for within estimates on the firm level. It might reflect a downward bias as
a result of measurement errors – because of, e.g., faulty deflators – or non-constant returns
to scale.5 The cash flow variable is also highly significant.
Inclusion of the uncertainty indicator yields a negative coefficient which is significant at
the 1% level, for the LSDV estimation as well as for the First Difference estimation, for
both lag lengths considered. For a given firm, an increase in uncertainty, as indicated by the
root of a moving average of squared residuals from a simple panel regression, is associated
with a lower level of investment demand. The results do not show us whether this
reduction is temporary or permanent. First Difference estimators lead to slightly higher
coefficients, which indicates that recent shocks might be more important for the firms than
those further back. Graph 3 is an "added variable plot" for the LSDV regression. For the
regression in column (3) it plots the firm specific mean deviations of the sales uncertainty
indicator against residuals computed by using all the other estimated coefficients. The
regression line demonstrates graphically how the uncertainty variable "fits" the data. The
results do not seem to be driven by outliers.
                                                
5 If returns to scale are increasing on an individual level, then either firms are demand constrained, or product
markets are imperfect. Furthermore, endogenous growth theory has demonstrated that returns to scale may be
constant for a given firm in a given year, but increasing for a group of firms if investment causes externalities.
But these questions are outside the focus of this paper.– 13 –
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No. obs. 29724 23005 29724 22979 29724 26018
No. firms 6745 6053 6745 6053 6745 6604
R
2 0.0790 0.0321 0.0793 0.0327 0.0792 0.0323
Further regressors: year dummies, constant. In parentheses: robust standard errors allowing for
autocorrelation within firms as well as heteroscedasticity in general. P-values use robust standard errors. R
2-
values relate to variation within firms. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at
10% level.– 14 –
The results in Table 1 might be affected by contemporaneous correlation between the
residuals of the investment equation and the real sales or cash flow terms. Endogeneity of
the uncertainty variable itself is improbable, as the indicator only uses observations up to
the period preceding the investment. As discussed in the Appendix, we estimate an
equation in levels. The variables on the right hand side, including the uncertainty indicator,
are instrumented by their own first difference, in order to eliminate the effect of the firm
specific latent variable.7 However, the contemporaneous variables, real sales growth and
cash flow per unit of capital, are instrumented by the respective average first difference in
the firm's cluster. The results for the neoclassical sales terms in Table 2 are similar to the
estimates in Table 1, whereas the cash flow term turns insignificant. The coefficient of the
uncertainty term remains significant with  015 . 0 = * , calculated on the basis of robust
standard errors, and it is numerically somewhat larger than the estimates in Table 1.


























The results have been subject to a large number of robustness checks. Apart from
experimenting with various lag lengths and different sample sizes according to the
minimum number of observations required for the uncertainty indicator, we used several
different ways to generate the uncertainty indicator. We used the Anderson-Hsiao approach
to obtain consistent estimates of the AR coefficient. In many cases this leads to extremely
                                                
7 The idea for this approach emerged in a discussion with Dietmar Harhoff.– 15 –
high standard errors for the estimated coefficients. Therefore we also used an Anderson-
Hsiao estimation for the whole sample, not differentiating between clusters. Furthermore,
we estimated (1) imposing  1 =   for each cluster, although the unit roots hypothesis is
rejected for most cases – see Breitung (1997) on the distribution of the Anderson-Hsiao
estimator in the case of unit roots. Finally, we estimated a version of (1) without time
dummies using OLS for each firm separately. All these estimates consistently yield
negative coefficients for the uncertainty indicator, of quite similar magnitudes to the ones
presented. Estimating differential effects for large and small firms using dummy variable
techniques does not reveal sizable differences in the attitude of firms towards risk.
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W L  , ˆ 0.0653  (0.0489) 0.0246  (0.0467)
1 , ˆ
− W L  0.1021  (0.0224)*** 0.0727  (0.0124)***
2 , ˆ
− W L  0.0693  (0.0167)*** 0.0455  (0.0112)***
3 , ˆ
− W L  0.0382  (0.0147)***




1 , , − W L W L  ) 0.0181  (0.1062) 0.0909  (0.0652)
2 , 1 , − − W L W L  ) 0.0105  (0.0230) 0.0075  (0.0195)
3 , 2 , − − W L W L  ) 0.0014  (0.0119) 0.0055  (0.0086)
4 , 3 , − − W L W L  ) -0.0018  (0.0130)









No. obs. 22979 22979
No. firms 6053 6053
R
2 0.0753 0.0662
Further regressors: year dummies, constant. In parentheses: robust standard errors allowing for
autocorrelation within firms and heteroscedasticity in general. R
2-values relate to overall variation. P-values
use robust standard errors.  Instruments: first differences of real sales (lag 1 to 3), of cash flow per unit of
capital (lag 1 to 3), of the uncertainty indicator and of cluster averages for contemporaneous real sales and
cash flow per unit of capital. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.– 16 –
;*		%		&'
In this section we test the relevance of cost uncertainty for investment. Again, we estimate
a fixed effects model, using both the LSDV and the First Difference estimators. In order to
save space, only the results for a lag length of three periods are presented, the estimates for
a lag length of two are almost identical. Table 3 can be read as a continuation of Table 1.
The first two columns report the results for an estimation using cost uncertainty only, and
the two columns on the right hand side refer to an equation that contains both uncertainty
indicators at the same time.
The first two columns show that cost uncertainty also has a significant negative impact on
investment. Compared to the estimations in the preceding paragraph, the absolute value of
the cost uncertainty coefficient is higher. However, we have to take into account that the
cost uncertainty indicator is less dispersed than the indicator for sales uncertainty. The
standard deviation of 
6
W  	 is almost three times the standard deviation of the cost
uncertainty indicator, see the Appendix. One standard deviation of the sales uncertainty
indicator will lower the predicted ratio of investment to installed capital by about 3.0% of
the latter variable's mean, and the respective ratio for cost uncertainty is 3.4%. The last two
columns show that the estimations are almost unaltered if the two uncertainty indicators are
combined in one equation. Again, we performed a series of robustness checks, which
turned out satisfactory in most respects. However, the instrumental variable approach
developed in the last section did not lead to consistent results.
<*	
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of uncertainty on investment is ambiguous.
The net effect of the diverse channels identified by theory can only be evaluated
empirically.
Our extremely large sample of firm level data is ideal for this purpose, as it avoids the
aggregation bias associated with sectoral data. The investigation demonstrates that in
Germany uncertainty in fact does have a systematic impact on investment, which is
consistently negative. To some extend, this result contradicts work of Böhm, Funke and
Siegfried (2000), also using German micro data.
Quantitatively, the estimated effect is moderate, but by no means negligible. An increase by
one standard deviation of our indictors for sales uncertainty and cost uncertainty together– 17 –
will lower predicted investment by approximately 6½% of the mean value. The weight of
uncertainty with respect to sales and costs seems to be about equal.
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No. obs. 29724 23005 29724 22979
No. firms 6745 6053 6745 6053
R
2 0.0795 0.0326 0.0798 0.0333
Further regressors: year dummies, constant. In parentheses: robust standard errors allowing for
autocorrelation within firms as well as heteroscedasticity in general. P-values use robust standard errors. R
2-
values relate to variation within firms. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at  5% level; * significant at
10% level.– 18 –
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Equations (13) and (14) correspond to the common two way error component regression
model,; which can be written in short hand as
W L W L W L W L  , , , ’ ζ + λ + α + β = # , (15)
where  W L  ,  is the endogenous variable for group (firm) i, β  the vector of coefficients, and
W L, #  the vector of explanatory variables. Following the convention established in (14),  L α
and  W λ  are individual specific and time specific latent variables, respectively, and  W L, ζ  is an
idiosyncratic error term.
We might start by assuming that the idiosyncratic error term is uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables  W L, # . But the individual specific latent variable  L α  and  W L, #  will quite
probably be correlated in the given context. The term  L α  stands for all those time-invariant
characteristics of a firm that influence investment but cannot be observed, such as research
intensity or entrepreneurial style. A firm at the leading edge of technology or characterized
by an aggressive expansionary strategy will certainly grow faster and invest more than the
average. At the same time, its prospects will be more uncertain, and volatility will be
unusually high. R&D intensity and aggressive behavior will thus be correlated with the
uncertainty indicator. In this case, an OLS estimation (or the more elaborate Random
Effects estimation, for that matter) will lead to biased and inconsistent results. Part of the
effect that actually results from the firm being technologically advanced or particularly
expansionary will be attributed to the uncertainty indicator.
The solution to this problem comes at a certain cost. The group specific latent variable can
be eliminated by differencing. First, one might transform each variable in (15) by
subtracting its lagged value, to obtain:
W L W W L LW  , , , ’ ζ ∆ + λ ∆ + ∆ β = ∆ # (16)
This equation can be estimated by least squares or a related technique. The individual
specific latent variable, being constant over time, has disappeared, and  W λ ∆  can be
                                                
; See the textbook expositions by Baltagi (1995), Ch. 2 and 3 or Hsiao (1986), Ch 3.– 19 –
accounted for by first differences of time dummies. Yet, by first differencing, we lose all
the variation % groups (firms) and we have to confine ourselves to the variation
% groups in order to identify the effects of  W # . Another transformation is possible and
usually preferred. If (15) is valid, it holds also true for the group averages:
L L L L  ζ + λ + α + β = # ’ (17)
The variables in this equation will no longer be time dependent. Subtracting (18) from (16),
we obtain an equation for deviations from group mean:
() L W L W L W L L W L   ζ − ζ + λ − λ + − β = − , , , ’ # # . (18)
Again the variable α , being constant, has disappeared, and the equation can be estimated
by least squares. Because this procedure yields the same results as using OLS with a set of




(LSDV) Estimator. Both First Difference and LSDV estimators are consistent, if the
assumptions are correct. The First Difference estimator may be less efficient, but it is more
robust against certain problems with autocorrelation.
2*- 
A second methodological concern is given by potential endogeneity of the regressors. The
investment rate and the outcomes of sales growth, cash flow and the uncertainty indicator
can be regarded as being jointly determined by the "company", a complicated dynamic
system interacting with a stochastic environment. Productivity shocks may affect
investment demand, real sales and cash flow at the same time. Furthermore, investment
often comes in bursts or "spikes", signaling a reorientation of entrepreneurial policy, and
this reorientation might also affect other regressors. In these cases, the error term  W L, ζ  in
(16) is correlated with the contemporary growth rates of sales or cash flow, and the OLS
estimates of equations (17) or (19) are biased and inconsistent. This might also be a source
of bias for the uncertainty coefficient, even if it is not directly affected by correlation.
An obvious solution to this problem is to use some sort of instrumental variable (IV)
estimation. The standard approach for microeconomic panel data basically goes back to– 20 –
Anderson and Hsiao (1981).< These authors propose to transform the regression equation
by first differencing in order to get rid of the individual specific effects, as in (16). In the
case of the investment equation, this leads to






























Now a set of instruments for the variables affected by contemporaneous correlation has to
be chosen. Consider for instance the linear combination of current and lagged sales. After
first differencing, the residual,  1 , , , − ζ − ζ = ζ ∆ W L W L W L  is correlated with current  lagged
values of   ˆ ∆ . Therefore the levels
 2 3 2 , ,...., , − − − − 0 W W W L     can be used as instruments for the
differences  P W  − ∆ . If there is no autocorrelation in the residuals, these levels are not
correlated with  W ζ ∆ , yet they may be highly correlated with  W  ˆ ∆  and  1 ˆ
− W  ∆ . Arellano and
Bond (1991) have refined this technique by developing GMM estimators using a different
number of orthogonality conditions according to the number of available lags.
In the estimation problem at hand, this approach has a serious drawback. The uncertainty
indicator,  W L  , , is not contemporaneously correlated with  W L, ζ , because it uses only
observations up to  1 −  . Yet, after differencing, we have to find instruments for
1 , , , − − = ∆ W L W L W L    , because of correlation with the transformed residual,  1 , , − ζ − ζ W L W L . The
residuals from which the uncertainty indicator are constructed are supposed to form the
 part of the movement in sales or costs. Therefore it is difficult to find valid
predetermined instruments.
We therefore propose an IV estimator for (13) and (14) that circumvents the need to find
predetermined instruments for  W L  , . Looking back at the model in (15), an alternative way
of estimating the panel equation is to "purge" the variables in  W L, #  of their correlation with
the latent individual specific error  L α  by using their own differences,  W L, # ∆ , as instruments.
These do not contain the individual specific effect any more, since it is differenced out, yet
they are highly correlated with the levels. Thus they are valid instruments. The idea of
"reversing" the Anderson-Hsiao technique by using differences as instruments for levels,
was explored by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in developing
the system GMM estimator. All the level variables in (13) can be instrumented this way,
with the exception of contemporary real sales and contemporary cash flow, because of
                                                
< The method was developed for use with autoregressive equations. Our exposition makes some slight
adaptations.– 21 –
potential endogeneity. These two variables are instrumented simply by the average first
differences of contemporaneous cash flow and contemporaneous real sales in the relevant
cluster of firms.
2""#	.	 	"
This section gives additional information on our sample. Table A1 shows the Industry
Composition of our sample.
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Petroleum Raffineries 16 132
Manufacture of Coke and Quarrying 222 1,645
Iron and Steel Production 118 859
Nonferrous Metals 64 495
Foundries 100 724
Metal Forming 284 2,087
Steel Structures 236 1,680
Machinery 1,169 8,726
Road Vehicles 166 1,255
Ships 8 63
Aeronautical Industry 4 32
Electrical Products 385 2,921
Precision and Optical Goods 285 2,119
Ironware and Sheet Metal 526 3,967
Music and Toys 134 944
Chemicals 349 2,629
EDP 19 130
Ceramic Products 70 523
Glassware 75 546
Wood 257 1,813
Wood Products 196 1,406
Cellulose 193 1,444
Paper and Paperboard 50 391
Printing and Duplication 268 1,998
Plastic 444 3,282
Rubber Products 59 455
Leather and Leatherwear 56 453
Textiles 327 2,410
Apparel 208 1,528
Food and Tobacco 448 3,302
  ;@<57 5A@A7A– 22 –
As the estimated equations contain lagged exogenous variable, the number of observations
in regressions is reduced to 29,527 or less, depending on the actual specification. The
sample covers the West German industrial structure relatively well, also with regard to the
share of small and medium sized enterprises. This can be seen from Table A2:
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675 2622 2547 901
10.01% 38.87% 37.76% 13.36%
Table A3 gives summary statistics for the variables used: the mean, the standard deviations
of levels and mean deviations, and the first three quartiles. Table A4 is the correlogram for















1 − W W   49959 0.18632 0.22111 0.19255 0.06007 0.12003 0.22303
W  ˆ 49959 0.02443 0.15581 0.14349 -0.06037 0.02577 0.10963
1 − W W  ) 49959 0.30481 0.52616 0.33850 0.11098 0.19369 0.34507
6
W  36500 0.17962 0.11207 0.06250 0.09915 0.15370 0.23250
&
W  41774 0.04847 0.03957 0.02191 0.02206 0.03817 0.06261
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Variable 1 − W W   W  ˆ





1 − W W   1
W  ˆ 0.1764 1
1 − W W  ) 0.2197 0.1751 1
6
W  0.0388 0.0166 0.0016 1
&
W  -0.0358 0.0031 -0.0056 0.1674 1– 23 –
Some definitions and details with respect to the variables follow:

,-. The data on additions to plant, property and equipment come from the
detailed schedule of fixed asset movements ('		). The schedule also includes
their value at historical costs. Not all firms show their investment data in the
'		, and, furthermore, missing investment data and zero investment are coded
by the same symbol in the raw data. An extremely cautious procedure was chosen to
impute a zero value only in cases where this is logically inevitable, in all other cases the
variable is coded as missing.
#	
 /
 ,- is computed by adjusting the historic cost values taken from the
'		 for inflation, and by applying a perpetual inventory procedure with a sector
specific depreciation rate for all years following the first year for which historic cost data
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where 
,
W M * ,  is a sector specific price of investment goods,  W   is real investment and  M δ  the
sector specific depreciation rate. The starting value is based on the net book value of
tangible fixed capital assets in the first observation within our sample period, adjusted for
inflation in previous years. Subsequent values are obtained using accounts data on
investment and national indices for investment goods prices.
0	
	
,-. This is sales deflated by a sector-specific index for output prices.
#
)	%
,#- is computed as net income plus depreciation, deflated by a sector-specific
index for output prices.
1	
 #	: The data set is trimmed by excluding the upper and the lower 1%
percentiles of   log ∆  and  1 − W W  )  and the two upper 1% percentiles of  1 − W W   .– 24 –
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